The Iraq Transitional Assistance Group is a stabilization strategy that involves Iraq’s immediate neighbors, the United Nations, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The ITAG provides multi-national political and military supervision in order to:
• Increase Iraqis’ confidence in the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Iraqi security forces
• Encourage entrance into the political process for groups that have remained outside the new democracy
• Create links between the various non-governmental armed groups in Iraq and the GoI
• Identify the pro-and anti-Iraqi forces, allowing the GoI to focus its security operations on anti-Iraqi groups
• Provide a structure for Iraq and its neighbors to control interaction in Iraq’s internal affairs and to guard against regional conflict
• Facilitate the implementation of the International Compact with Iraq
• Allow the United States to withdraw its combat forces
ITAG political functions
Multi-national teams comprised of representatives of Iraq’s neighbors will monitor the actions of the national government to increase confidence that the Government of Iraq represents the interests of every citizen regardless of ethnicity or religion. The political supervisory teams will:
• Monitor Iraqi government actions and verify their inclusive, unbiased character
• Advocate the rights of ethnic and confessional allies
• Convince those allies to join the central government
• Moderate factional demands and expectations
ITAG military functions
Multi-national teams will embed with Iraqi Security forces and leadership elements. They will also monitor the Iraqi facilities protection service and those non-governmental forces that will accept the monitors and commit to engaging solely in defensive actions. The recently formed Concerned Local Citizens groups and the Sunni Awakening Councils as well as the Shiite militias are prime targets. The teams must always be multi-national. Combat forces from any of Iraq’s neighbors must NOT be introduced. The military supervisory teams will:
• Monitor the Ministry of Defense and all assigned forces
• Monitor the Ministry of Interior and all assigned forces
• Monitor those militia/insurgency groups accepting ITAG military supervision willingly or as a term of surrender
• Verify security operations target only enemies of Iraq
• Validate Iraqi calls for air support from US forces
FAQ (Answers by Alan Howe)
Q: Why can we not just leave—pull out our forces and go home?
A: We face two difficult questions concerning Iraq. Is it better to stay or leave? And, what do we leave behind? In the Senate, when a proposal to answer the first question with “leave” reaches the floor, an answer to the second question is immediately invoked. A minority of Senators, who support the President and a continued stay for US forces in Iraq, claim that chaos and severe bloodshed will result from our departure. They predict a much more lethal civil war will consume Iraq and may spread across the country’s borders to affect our allies in the region. Indeed, the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate predicted that Iraqi Security Forces would become a sectarian force, neighboring countries may intervene, and “massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable.”
The Iraq Transitional Assistance Group provides an opportunity to guard against this result, so that the answer to the first question can be “leave.” When US combat forces leave, Iraq and its neighbors will have to manage the consequences. The ITAG prepares them for that challenge.
Proponents of staying in Iraq argue that once the Iraqis complete essential steps toward reconciliation the country will stabilize and US forces can return home. That makes our troops, in effect, hostage to the political, ethnic, and sectarian divides in Iraq. Unfortunately, American military strength is unlikely to resolve those divides. We must rescue our forces from this situation. The ITAG provides a morally defensible means to accomplishing that rescue mission.
Q: The violence in Iraq is down. Isn’t the “surge” working?
A: No. The surge is not working. Claims that the surge is a success point to the reduction in violence. American fatalities in Iraq have declined steadily from the third-highest total of the occupation—126, in May—to the second-lowest count of 23, in December. However, if the goal is a reduction in American deaths, we can make the number zero by leaving.
President Bush introduced the surge in January 2007, claiming it would allow the Iraqi government to achieve a series of benchmarks that would stabilize the country and allow us to leave. Nearly nothing of real consequence has happened in that regard. The surge has not removed the problem of Iraqis moving at their own pace while Americans pay in national treasure and blood the costs of buying them time.
The surge is a failure also because it detracts from other vital national interests. The United States defense capabilities are being severely degraded by our occupation of Iraq. Meanwhile, a July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate argues that al Qaeda has reconstituted its forces. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain beyond our reach six years after the 9/11 attacks. The surge has exacerbated both issues. It has accelerated the drain on our defense capabilities and increased the number of troops not available to participate in the hunt for al Qaeda and its leadership. The ITAG allows the United States to refocus on these two critical issues while enlisting the help of the international community and Iraq’s neighbors to achieve US and international objectives in Iraq.
Q: How does this differ from the plan advocated by Senator Biden?
A: Senator Biden’s and Leslie Gelb’s federation plan, which is sometimes wrongly referred to as a partitioning plan, is a recommendation—to use the Senator’s word—that the Iraqi government proceed with the national and provincial governments outlined in the Iraqi Constitution. Few would argue that the government should not do that, and the Senator’s resolution passed the Senate with a large majority. However, the Bush administration and the Iraqi Prime Minister rejected this call. More to the point perhaps, the Biden/Gelb plan does not enhance the US or Iraqi ability to achieve the federation called for in the constitution or any other result that would acceptably stabilize Iraq.
The ITAG does not call for a specific outcome although the current constitution should be amended if another outcome is desired. Rather, the ITAG provides the means to support the Iraqis as they formulate national and provincial governments. It buys the Iraqis time that the people of the United States no longer want to provide. The ITAG also anticipates that participation by Iraq’s neighbors will, by necessity, lead to a democratic government that protects minority rights—precisely the example for the Middle East that President Bush has often advocated. In this case, the example is more relevant and effective since the democratic government will be constructed by some of the nations the President hopes will be influenced by a new Islamic democracy.
Q: Why would Iran and Syria want to join? And if they do join won't they act contrary to American and Iraqi interests?
A: In a Washington Post op-ed, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued for an international effort to resolve the divides in Iraq (How to Change Iraq, September 6, 2007, A21). Secretary Albright explained why other nations would participate in the effort.
“The Saudi, Jordanian and Syrian governments all view Iraqi instability as a profound security threat. Turkish and Kurdish representatives recently signed an agreement to cooperate along their troubled border. Iran is the wildest of cards, but it would be unlikely to isolate itself from a broad international program. If it does, it would only hand a political victory to us and to the many Iraqi leaders, Shiite and Sunni alike, who would prefer to minimize Iranian influence.”
Iraq’s neighbors are already openly and clandestinely involved in Iraq’s internal affairs to varying degrees. They risk widening the conflict as long as some or most of their actions are covert and subject to misinterpretation. The ITAG brings legitimacy and openness to the neighbors’ activities. It will increase the likelihood, for example, that Iran will be forced to ensure a halt to official and unofficial arms supplies to Shiite militias. Four of Iraq’s neighbors—Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—are American allies. They will help keep Syria and Iran in check as will a UN Security Council Resolution that requires annual reauthorization of the ITAG. Finally, the US remains the strongest military power in the region and will be better able to address any challenges from Iran once we have reduced or ended our entanglement in Iraq.
Q: Would Iraq accept supervision and monitoring by its neighbors?
A: Political legitimacy in Iraq currently comes from democratic elections. Barring a very disappointing setback, the country will continue improving along that path. The Shi’a population of Iraq, as long as political groupings retain a sectarian flavor, will continue to dominate the government. However, ruling the country is nearly impossible today. Sovereign governments have both the right and responsibility to exercise a monopoly on violence. That will be the key to stabilizing Iraq. Even with help from the United States, the current government cannot exercise a monopoly. The ITAG military supervisory function will aid the Iraqi government in achieving full sovereignty. That can only be a benefit for the current government.
Q: The problems in Iraq are fundamentally internal Iraq political problems. How will the ITAG solve the political disagreement among Iraqis?
A: First, the political supervision provided by the Iraq Transitional Assistance Group will provide assurances to Iraqis of all ethnicities and religious beliefs that they can join and thrive in the new Iraqi democracy. This will allow a shift from a mercantilist view of what can be had from Iraq now to a look forward at a share in an Iraq that is much more than the country is today.
Second, the military supervision will assure minority groups in Iraq no longer must perceive Iraqi security forces as existential threats. The presence of ITAG monitors ensures the group is fighting for the good of Iraq, not for a particular faction. Groups such as the Sunni Awakening Councils in Anbar and other provinces will be tied to the central government and no longer a worry for Shiite leaders in Baghdad.
Third, the ITAG may have more staying power than the United States, which has already spent over $400 billion and lost nearly 4,000 lives. Before the surge started, many asserted an incompatibility between the Washington and Baghdad “timelines.” One year after President Bush announced the surge, Americans have lost an additional 900 troops and see no appreciable gains in political reconciliation. With the ITAG, the Iraqis and their neighbors will have the time they need to resolve complex issues while the US is relieved of an enormous, unsupportable cost.
Q: Why does the draft legislation not call specifically for attacks against al Qaeda in Iraq as a remaining mission?
A: Iraqis will destroy the al Qaeda in Iraq organization. Most al Qaeda in Iraq members are Iraqi Sunni Arabs opposed to the occupation. The foreign fighters of AQI represent a minority that may fill leadership roles. AQI has abundant enemies in Iraq beyond the American military. Al Qaeda comes from a Wahabi strain of Sunni Islam. Sixty percent of Iraqis are Shi’a who will never consent to al Qaeda domination. Iraqi Sunnis also have rejected the severe brand of Islam and terrorist tactics of AQI, leading to the creation of the Awakening Councils. While some have argued al Qaeda will build a caliphate in Iraq, all should note that the Iraqi government, with nearly 400,000 security forces and help from the United States, has been unable to secure the country. The meager forces of al Qaeda can murder and maim Iraqis, but they cannot rule the country. The ending of the occupation will further de-legitimize their actions. The US will support ITAG-supervised operations against all other non-ITAG forces in Iraq, including AQI.
Q: If we no longer fight them there, will we have to fight them here?
A: We have to guard the homeland and United States interests around the globe all the time. With the center of al Qaeda—the group that successfully attacked us in 2001—now regrouped and reconstituted along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, our defense needs to be better than ever. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri need to be our primary targets in this fight, not a Sunni anti-occupancy insurgency in Iraq. The Iraq Transitional Assistance Group will help us refocus this fight on the primary threat. It will allow us to fight them over there, where bin Laden and al Zawahiri enjoy undeserved freedom, rather than fighting them here. The neglected fight against al Qaeda can resume in full force.
Henry
Kissinger